Externalities again
I just wasted half an hour of my life on the phone with my credit card company’s fraud department, as someone attempted to buy expensive tickets from an airline in Panama. Most likely my card number was compromised by Target, although it could also be due to Adobe.
It is actually surprising such breaches do not occur on a daily basis—the persons paying for the costs of a compromise (the card holder, defrauded merchants and their credit card companies via the cost of operating their fraud departments) are not the same as those paying for the security measures that would prevent the said breach, a textbook example of what economists call an externality. There are reputational costs to a business that has a major security breach, but they are occurring so often consumers are getting numbed to them.
Many states have mandatory breach disclosure laws, following California’s example. It is time for legislatures to take the next step and impose statutory damages for data breaches, e.g. $100 per compromised credit card number, $1000 per compromised social security number, and so on. In Target’s case, 40 million compromised credit cards multiplied by $100 would mean $4 billion in damages. That would make management take notice and stop paying mere lip service to security. It might also jump-start the long overdue migration to EMV chip-and-PIN cards in the United States.